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ABSTRACT 
The term ‘human nature’ can refer to different things in the world and fulfil dif-
ferent epistemic roles. Human nature can refer to a classificatory nature (classifi-
catory criteria that determine the boundaries of, and membership in, a biological 
or social group called ‘human’), a descriptive nature (a bundle of properties de-
scribing the respective group’s life form), or an explanatory nature (a set of fac-
tors explaining that life form). This chapter will first introduce these three kinds 
of human nature, together with seven reasons why we disagree about human 
nature. In the main, this chapter focuses on the explanatory concept of human 
nature, which is related to one of the seven reasons for disagreement, namely, the 
scientific authority inherent in the term ‘nature’. I will examine why, in a number 
of historical contexts, it was attractive to refer to ‘nature’ as an explanatory cate-
gory, and why this usage has led to the continual contestation of the term within 
the sciences. The claim is that even if the contents of talk about ‘nature’ varied 
historically, the term’s pragmatic function of demarcation stayed the same. The 
term ‘nature’ conveys scientific authority over a territory; ‘human nature’ is a 
 concept used to divide causes, as well as experts, and thereby conquer others 
who threaten to invade one’s epistemic territory. Analysing this demarcation, 
which has social as well as epistemic aspects, will help us to understand why the 
explanatory role has been important and why it is unlikely that people will ever 
agree on either the meaning or the importance of ‘human nature’ as an explana-
tory category. 
 
10.1  SEVEN REASONS WHY WE DISAGREE ABOUT HUMAN NATURE 
There are at least seven reasons why we disagree about human nature. The first 
two are connected to what I call the politics of human nature, and the rest are 
connected to scientific issues. The last of these reasons is the focus of this chapter. 
First, human nature is about ‘our’ nature. David Hull (1986: 6) noted that we of-
ten describe other species in a careful statistical and non-normative manner, but 
when it comes to our species, we often fall back into essentialist traps, involving 
normalcy and normativity. Hull regarded this ‘coincidence [as] highly suspi-
cious’. In the words of Proctor (2003: 220), we do not ask about an entity ‘being 
“fully cockroach” or “fully chimpanzee”’, but we do regard some humans as 
more fully human than others, or as realizing more natural goodness. The source 
of this exceptionalist way of dealing with our nature lies, first and foremost, not 
in any epistemic functions of the concept, but rather in its normative function for 
us, which is after all a political function. With respect to this function, the concept 
is essentially contested in the sense of Gallie (1956): the only essence in that con-
cept is that it is contested. In terms of a slogan: by continuously contesting what 
it means to be human, we continuously become human.1 
Second, the history of the vernacular (or folk) concept of human nature suggests 
that ‘being human’ is an empty category that simply says, in the words of Mar-
shall Sahlins (2008), ‘L’espèce, c’est moi.’ If ‘human nature’, in a broad descrip-
tive sense, simply refers to ‘what it means to be human’, then this concept has 
been used—historically and in different cultures—for whatever characterizes the 
respective in-group. The respective out-groups are consequently dehumanized, 
that is, regarded as less human.2 Evidence from historical, anthropological, and 
                                            
1 For human nature as an essentially contested concept, see Kronfeldner (forthcoming). 
‘Becoming human’ by contesting the meaning of human nature involves not only ‘mak-
ing meaning’ (e.g. in the sense of Toren, Ch. 9 this volume) but also ‘making people’ (in 
the sense of Hacking’s (1995) looping effects). 
2 See Kronfeldner (2016), where I discuss the connection between dehumanization and 
human nature in detail. Dehumanization does not require a concept of human nature in a 
narrow sense (i.e. contrasted to culture); all it requires is either a graded genealogical 
association (people as more or less genealogically related) or a differential attribution of 
properties deemed to be central for ‘what it means to be human’. However, the idea that 
these properties are part of a human nature is a catalyzer for dehumanization. 
à 
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 psychological scholarship supports this claim about the exchangeability of the 
content (or ‘indexicality’, as Smith 2013 termed it). As a result, the content of the 
concepts ‘human’ and ‘human nature’ varies, even when the political function of 
social demarcation—of demarcating the in-group from the out-group—stays the 
same. Consequently, different human groups will (explicitly or implicitly) disa-
gree about ‘what it means to be human’ and thus about human nature.  
Contemporary scientific approaches that use the concept of human nature will 
try to prevent the exchangeability of the content of the vernacular concept.3 
Nonetheless, scientific approaches will face their own set of disagreements, based 
on differences in usage. Usage differs, for instance, depending on the epistemic 
goal, since from the scientific point of view, the term ‘human nature’ can be used 
for the purposes of description, explanation, or classification. In turn, these goals 
guide the production of knowledge. The term ‘human nature’ can, accordingly, 
refer to one of three ‘natures’: 
• to a descriptive nature: a bundle of properties describing the respective 
group’s life form, that is, what it means to be human; 
• to an explanatory nature: a set of factors with explanatory relevance for 
the respective life form; 
• to a classificatory nature: classificatory criteria that determine the bound-
aries of, and membership in, a biological or social group called ‘human’. 
According to the traditional essentialist picture, an essence or nature is, by con-
trast, a thing that fulfils all three of these epistemic roles simultaneously. An es-
sence is first and foremost classificatory and explanatory. It is what ‘makes’ indi-
viduals human, definitionally and causally. The descriptive role is derivative but 
covered too, since the description of the properties that are characteristic of the 
respective kind at issue (e.g. human beings) is the explanandum, i.e. what is ex-
plained by the essence. Thus, if you do not yet know the characteristic properties 
of the kind and you learn about the ‘essence’, then you can derive the properties 
explained by the essence. In addition, ‘essence’ often had a normative connota-
tion: what is part of human nature is not just classificatory and explanatory (and 
derivatively descriptive), but also what a ‘normal’ human should exhibit.4 
                                            
3 With this and the following, I restrict my analysis to the history of the tradition from 
which modern science emerged. There are certainly ways of having things completely 
different, e.g. on the basis of alternative ontologies, such as those described by Descola 
(2005). For a comparison and discussion of traditions other than those of the West, see 
Lloyd (2012, 2015). If these traditions are taken into account, at least two further reasons 
for disagreement come to the fore: different ontologies (process ontology, relational on-
tology, substance ontology, and so on), as addressed by Dupré (Ch. 5 this volume) and 
Toren (Ch. 9), and different meanings of the nature/culture divide. Space does not suffice 
to discuss these issues. 
4 The connection between the normative role and the three epistemic roles is not easy to 
capture, especially since it has a long history, with all the variation that comes with that. 
As Lloyd makes clear: ‘When certain phenomena or practices are labelled “unnatural”, 
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 In the current philosophy of science literature on human nature, there is only one 
significant consensus, namely, that traditional essentialism is wrong. What re-
mains is a pluralism of human nature concepts.5 This pluralism, derived from 
anti-essentialism, has a couple of important aspects that can help us to under-
stand why, even within science, we can (and likely often will) disagree about 
human nature. 
First, there is a plurality of referents for the term ‘human’; often the assumption 
is that it refers to members of the species Homo sapiens, but even that is contest-
ed.6 Consequently, the term ‘human’ can be interpreted to refer to recent humans 
only, to a larger biological group (e.g. to one including the Neanderthals), or 
even to a purely social group (e.g. to all those able to communicate and interact 
in rational and moral ways with others). None of these interpretations is, in and 
of itself, more scientific or objective than any other, and which referent is chosen 
depends on the disciplinary focus. Sociology is unlikely to be interested in bio-
logical groups and will focus on social groups. Biologically oriented disciplines 
will tend to focus on one of the biological groupings. This ‘relativity of human 
nature’, as Machery (Chapter 1 this volume) calls it, causes a considerable 
amount of disagreement. Without fixing the group to which the term refers, eve-
rything else about ‘human nature’ will float around loosely. Unfortunately, in 
many discussions the referent is left implicit. 
Second, there is disagreement about the classificatory criteria, even if there is 
agreement on the reference to a respective group. Hull (1986), for instance, takes 
the genealogical nexus (i.e. the genealogical relations between people) as the 
classificatory criterion for delineating Homo sapiens; others disagree, opting for a 
cluster of properties to delineate the species. By contrast, if ‘human’ refers to a 
social group, a social nexus (analogous to the genealogical nexus) or social trait 
clusters can be taken as definitional. 
Third, people are unlikely to fully agree on which properties are part of the de-
scriptive nature. Darwinian ontology tells us that variation is not just ubiquitous 
in all biological species, but necessary for evolution to occur. Thus none of the 
traditional, intrinsic candidate properties for a descriptive human nature—
rationality, intentionality, morality, language, and so on—are strictly instantiated 
by all and only humans. Furthermore, depending on what evidence is taken into 
                                                                                                                       
that is sometimes just an expression of disapproval […] with no reference to how fre-
quent (“normal” in that sense) the “unnatural” may be. The antecedents of that use go 
back (again) to Aristotle […] What is para phusin can be more common than what is kata 
phusin’ (pers. comm., 25 Nov 2015). For general discussion of the normative role of hu-
man nature and how it connects to the concept of ‘normal’, see Foot (2001), Thompson 
(2008). For a critical take on it, see Antony (1998, 2000); Silvers (1998).  
5 As described in detail in Kronfeldner et al. (2014). I will here only summarize the result-
ing pluralism and add the points that relate to the kinds of disagreements resulting from 
it. 
6 See e.g. Smith (2013).  
189 
 account, any claim about a property’s typicality and uniqueness can be chal-
lenged. One researcher might stress that non-human animals are also rational, 
though not moral; another might argue that they are moral in some sense, but do 
not have the same intentionality. Can there ever be an end to this kind of reason-
ing, given that it is likely that whatever property we choose, we will eventually 
find something similar in other animals if we search for it hard enough? Fur-
thermore, since these candidate properties are presumably all connected, and 
since no one property describes better than any other what is typical and/or 
unique about the human life form, there is a choice involved if people focus on 
specific candidate properties that ‘make us human’. Taking these two problems 
together (one about evidence, one about relationships among the properties), an 
interesting underdetermination results: certain properties can be prioritized 
without science providing any objective foundation for this priority. Some re-
searchers will highlight rationality, others morality, still others the opposable 
thumb, and so on. As is often the case with underdetermination, both discipli-
nary focus and social values affect what is considered to be the most important 
property (or properties) of ‘being human’; and there is often no way to find 
agreement on this choice from within science. 
Fourth, a descriptive property (or property cluster) is not necessarily the same 
thing as a classificatory criterion. For instance, relations between people in a 
group are simply not the same as the cluster of properties characteristic of that 
group. Thus, if the classificatory criterion is the genealogical nexus, then that 
‘nature’ is simply not the same as the descriptive nature. Equally, clustered prop-
erties are not the same as the factors explaining these properties. Consequently, 
there are different things in the world that we can call a ‘human nature’. It fol-
lows that the term ‘human nature’ can refer to whatever it is that fulfils the classi-
ficatory role, the descriptive role, or the explanatory role. As Kronfeldner et al. 
(2014) show, none of the candidates for a post-essentialist nature can do the same 
epistemological work as traditional, essentialist accounts, since none of them will 
fulfil a classificatory, descriptive, and explanatory role simultaneously. Disa-
greement among the anti-essentialists (i.e. those that agree that traditional essen-
tialism does not apply to biological species) results mainly from this post-
essentialist pluralism. 
Fifth, even though the disagreement rests on the anti-essentialism of the field, it 
is often catalysed by the normative dimension of the term ‘nature’ in the sciences. 
At the core of this normativity is the idea of ‘nature’ as a contrastive term. While 
some prioritize what they call ‘human nature’, others prioritize its contrast—for 
instance, human culture. Since scientists disagree on what is important, given the 
disciplinary structure of science (among other things), they also disagree about 
the importance of human nature as an explanatory principle, despite the fact that 
their approaches can be understood as complementary. Some want to appropri-
ate the term for what they consider to be important, while others oppose it be-
cause they deem something else to be important. For instance, ‘nature’ in the 
explanatory sense will be important for explanatory fields such as cognitive psy-
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 chology; ‘nature’ in the descriptive sense will be important for fields that simply 
want to describe humans (e.g. anatomy, physiology); others still (e.g. cultural 
anthropologists) will regard ‘nature’ as explanatorily and descriptively unim-
portant for what they study.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will show in detail that there is an inherited, norma-
tivity-generating authority in the term ‘nature’ that derives from the pragmatics 
of legitimizing one’s style of inquiry in the marketplace of knowledge production. 
The importance of appropriating the term ‘nature’ for the causes and phenomena 
one is studying is analogous to the importance of appropriating the term ‘truth’ 
for the resulting claims. To call what one studies ‘nature’ is to give one’s research 
a seal of quality and importance, as it is traditionally a seal of quality and vital to 
call one’s research findings a ‘truth’. 
It is because of this pragmatic dimension that different parties appropriate the 
term or oppose its use; it is used to highlight their research and what it is they 
believe to be important. Since there will be no agreement on what is scientifically 
important (as this is usually determined by the scientist’s particular research in-
terests), there will be no agreement on what constitutes human nature, despite 
agreement on matters of fact. 
I will argue that this fifth scientific source of disagreement, resulting from the 
authority that the term ‘nature’ imbues, is the reason why some contemporary 
post-essentialist accounts—even those in this volume—are unlikely to agree on 
how we should use the term ‘human nature’. 
10.2  THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE AUTHORITY IN-
HERENT IN THE TERM ‘NATURE’ 
If the pragmatic function of a concept is ignored, it will be hard to see why peo-
ple care, why people fight for or against a concept or specific term. To under-
stand the pragmatic function, we need to understand the authority that the term 
‘nature’ imbues. The claim that I will defend in the following is an extension of 
what Geoffrey Lloyd (1991: 432) claimed for the concept of nature in Greek An-
tiquity: 
“the idea of nature was supposed to stand simply for what is there, for 
what can be taken for granted. Yet what that comprised was repeatedly 
contested, not just so far as the natural world in general went, but also as 
far as human nature is concerned […] Nature was what was presupposed 
to be there to investigate: its supposed objective reality was what guaran-
teed the viability of the investigation. Yet what that vaunted objective re-
ality consisted in was contested in every conceivable respect.”  
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 10.3  NATURE? 
Even though there is a mind-boggling variety of meanings attached to the term 
‘nature’ (derived from the Latin natura, and going back to the Greek physis), two 
aspects are quite basic, according to Lloyd (1991): that ‘nature’ refers to the na-
ture of things, and that it refers to the things of nature. The first meaning con-
cerns the essences of kinds, which has strong connections to growth and repro-
duction, etymologically. The things of nature, by contrast, can be understood as 
those things that can be investigated in a systematic manner, oriented towards 
accessible evidence. The rainbow and further ‘natural’ phenomena were the first 
things in the Western history of philosophy that became naturalized in this sense. 
The moment they were no longer conceived of as mythological, they became part 
of nature.7 
What unites these two basic meanings is that since Greek antiquity they have 
both been used in a dualistic (i.e. antithetical) manner. They carry a contrast: nat-
ural versus supranatural and natural versus cultural, to name just two of the con-
trasts that form part of a dualistic landscape.8 The contrast between nature and 
culture is under much attack, including in this volume. Elsewhere, I defend the 
contrast against its critics (Kronfeldner forthcoming), but here I aim to analyse 
(rather than criticize or defend) the nature/culture divide as one instantiation of 
the contrastiveness in ‘nature’. 
10.4  A CORE CLAIM AND TWO MAIN FOLLOW-UP THESES 
There are pragmatic reasons for these contrasts: they are used not only to demar-
cate phenomena and to explain those phenomena, but also to demarcate exper-
tise over the phenomena and explanations, i.e. to establish epistemic authority 
for a special group of people. 
I will establish this core claim by looking at historical cases from Greek antiquity, 
Enlightenment philosophy, the advent of the study of heredity at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, and contemporary evolutionary psychology. Each case 
highlights a time when the term ‘nature’ was used in contrast to something else 
and was used pragmatically, to assert authority. 
                                            
7 The term ‘nature’ is quite fundamental in many diverse philosophical fields. That might 
explain why it has so many meanings and why, interestingly, there are no articles on 
‘nature’ in any of the major philosophy encyclopedias (e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy or the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy); ‘nature’ might be too funda-
mental. For an insightful and classic discussion, see Mill (1874), as well as Collingwood 
(1945) and Lewis (1960).  
8 In feminist and post-structuralist discourse, the contrastiveness of nature is often re-
garded as hierarchical: ‘“Otherness” entails boundaries, exclusions and inclusions po-
liced by categories and rules […] Otherness is not reciprocal’ (Haste 2000: 177). This 
means that nature is primary and that the contrasts depend on it. What I defend here is 
compatible with such a claim about hierarchy, but does not rely on it. 
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 The first follow-up thesis that can be derived from looking at the historical cases 
is that, even if the assumed contrasts to, and the contents of, talk about ‘nature’ 
(in the context of understanding human life) varied historically, the pragmatic 
function of demarcation and exclusion—to demarcate and then exclude kinds of 
explanations and the experts offering them—stayed the same, at least in the cases 
mentioned. The second follow-up thesis will be that given this history, it is plau-
sible that the term ‘nature’ is often used in this pragmatic sense, namely, to gain 
authority for one’s style of inquiry—i.e. the methods one uses, which also de-
pend on what one regards as important. Since styles of inquiry will vary, the 
term’s referent will vary too, and there will be no way to settle on one variant. 
10.5  THE INVENTION OF NATURE IN GREEK ANTIQUITY 
“… some of those who insisted on the category of the natural [in Greek 
Antiquity] used it to demarcate and justify their style of inquiry, their 
methodology, in contrast to those of rivals whom they were hoping to put 
out of business.” (Lloyd 1991: 422) 
In this quotation, ‘some of those’ refers to some of the Hippocratic authors, and 
the contrast at issue was that between the natural and the supranatural. The au-
thor of the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease, for instance, claimed that all 
diseases are naturally (rather than divinely) caused, including the ‘sacred dis-
ease’, a disease probably most similar to what is now called epilepsy. It is a dis-
ease, as the author of the Hippocratic treatise claimed, that is ‘nowise more di-
vine than others […] it has its nature such as other diseases have, and a cause 
whence it originates, and its nature and cause are divine only just as much as all 
others are, and it is curable no less than the others’ (Hippocrates 1849: 847). 
At that time, such all-inclusive claims about natures and causes tended to be 
made on the basis of faith, rather than because of any knowledge of facts, even 
though the Hippocratic authors certainly had some knowledge about diseases, 
and offered sketches of naturalistic explanations for particular diseases. They 
used these sketches (and the related all-inclusive claims) to argue against those 
whom they wanted to put out of business—that is, those who believed that the 
cause of disease was divine visitation and that the cure lay in ritual purification 
and incantation. There was often no consensus about what knowledge was avail-
able, even among the Hippocratic authors and practitioners. Thus, since the posi-
tive explanations were sketchy, often rather speculative, and controversial, the 
naturalness of all diseases was assumed. This was important for the demarcation 
of their business and the exclusion of others from it. The Hippocratics not only 
offered arguments against those attributing the disease to divine influences, the 
‘con-jurors, purificators, mountebanks, and charlatans’ (Hippocrates 1849: 841), 
but also complained that their enemies were in the business of understanding 
diseases for money. However, the Hippocratics were in it for money as well, and 
sometimes for a lot (Lloyd 1978: 18–19). In the words of the Hippocratic treatise 
The Law, the practical problem was that ‘in the cities there is no punishment con-
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 nected with the practice of medicine’ (Hippocrates 1849: 784). By contrast, the 
Babylonians had the Hammurabic Code, and Egypt had a state-controlled medi-
cal hierarchy (Porter 1997: 53f.). These institutions regulated and, in so doing, 
demarcated the behaviour of those in the business of healing people. Given that 
in ancient Greece there was no legal means to demarcate the Hippocratic style of 
inquiry from temple medicine—for instance, by academic titles or similar qualifi-
cations—the battle of demarcation had to be fought by different means. 
The tools that were used as a stand-in for legal methods were conceptual. The 
Hippocratics utilized their epistemic tools to defend their lot from their competi-
tors. They established an explicit and general concept of nature that they called 
physis. This was a concept that Aristotle (influenced by the Hippocratics) brought 
to full bloom, but that earlier Greek writers—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, 
Xenophanes, and so on—were already using. An important point to keep in 
mind, however, is that the way we interpret these philosophers now tends to be 
anachronistic: it is only given later developments that pre-Socratic philosophers 
appear as natural philosophers, as we now call them. If we try to keep this in 
mind, Lloyd (1991: 418–20) claims, then what was new in the Hippocratic treatis-
es and then in Aristotle was that physis had changed from merely referring to the 
nature of things to also explicitly referring to the things of nature—that is, to a 
general ‘domain of nature’ (p. 420). Lloyd admits that there had been some idea 
of a domain with ‘regularities of what we call natural phenomena’ (p. 419, em-
phasis added) already in existence, but ‘there is all the difference in the world 
between an implicit assumption and the explicit concept’  (p. 419, emphasis origi-
nal).9 
Consequently, that the Greeks (and not the Babylonians nor the Egyptians) de-
veloped an explicit, general, and systematic concept of naturally caused versus 
supranaturally caused things is less surprising if we take into account that they 
could make practical, pragmatic use of it: they could use it for social demarcation 
and exclusion. There are, of course, other factors relevant in the explanation of 
why the general notion of nature was invented in the context of Greek antiquity 
and not elsewhere. Nonetheless, epistemic and social demarcation was an im-
portant function, it seems. In Lloyd’s (1991: 432) words, ‘the category of the natu-
ral was used to legitimate a point of view specific to the interests of some particu-
lar group’. Hippocratic authors organized around naturalism and against any 
divine interference, uniting—despite disagreement about the precise causes of 
particular diseases—against an enemy (theurgy, magic) in the marketplace of 
healing people. 
                                            
9 For further details and justification, see also Hager’s section (1971–207) on Greek antiq-
uity in the entry on ‘nature’ in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Lloyd’s claim is 
compatible with Lehoux’s (2012: 57), namely, that the idea of laws of nature (even in its 
non-modern form) was not yet part of the Greek ‘invention of nature’. For more on the 
connection between Greek philosophy and Hippocratic medicine, see Lloyd (2003).  
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 The content of the concept of nature at this time, in the context of explaining the 
traits of people (e.g. the ‘sacred disease’), depended on its contrast with the su-
pranatural. The pragmatic function of the concept and of the term was to legiti-
mize styles of explanation and to appropriate phenomena—to define and cir-
cumscribe a specific medical practice. In this way, the concept (and the term) 
‘nature’ divided (kinds of causes, methods to study these causes) and thereby con-
quered (competitors for authority over certain phenomena). Dividing kinds of 
practices entails dividing kinds of causes (in this case, natural and supranatural). 
Thus the pragmatic function of both concept and term was connected with a spe-
cific epistemic role of the concept, namely, explanation: via demarcation, it was 
decided which kinds of causes were relevant for the explanandum. 
The pragmatic function of demarcation is thus not only social, but epistemic. This 
is so in two senses. First, it is concepts (rather than titles or degrees) that are used 
for demarcation. Second, the demarcation does something to our epistemic activ-
ities (such as causal explanations): it legitimizes them as adequate. The concept of 
nature thus acted as a framework, defining kinds of causes via contrast (natural 
versus supranatural) and deciding which causes were relevant and which tools 
(medical practice, Hippocratic style of inquiry) could and should be used to 
study the phenomena at issue (in this case, diseases). 
Why is this relevant for a discussion of human nature? The term ‘human nature’ 
is seldom used these days with the contrast between natural and supranatural in 
mind. The concept has changed. However, the Hippocratics’ use of it in Greek 
antiquity gives support to the idea that ‘nature’ can be used to define kinds of 
relevant causes and thus function as an authority-granting epistemic tool, deter-
mining who can legitimately study and claim expertise about a given phenome-
non. In the following, I will provide further evidence for this idea. 
10.6  ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN 
NATURE 
Roger Smith (1995, 1997) found a similar process of demarcation and exclusion 
when human nature became a major philosophical topic during the Enlighten-
ment.10 Again, it was a common enemy that united those involved. For the En-
lightenment philosophers interested in a naturalized and empirical ‘science of 
man’, the enemy was metaphysics in general, and Christianity and Renaissance 
humanism more specifically. 
As with the Hippocratics, the concept of nature was treated as an a priori con-
cept: that there is such a nature was taken for granted. Furthermore, the concept 
defined an area of study, the new ‘science of man’. The concept of nature, and in 
                                            
10 Smith writes: ‘To quote references to human nature in the eighteenth century is a bit 
like quoting references to God in the Bible: it is the subject around which everything else 
revolves’ (1997: 216). 
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 this case ‘human nature’, once again determined the framework within which 
diverse content or explanations were discussed and appropriated. The dominant 
contrast was between empirical investigation and speculative metaphysics. A 
science of human nature did not necessarily entail a naturalization of human 
nature or thinking about it in physicalist terms, but the new experimental meth-
ods stimulated interested philosophers to seek out systematic, empirical 
knowledge about humans. 
David Hume, for instance, used the term ‘human nature’ to specify the target of 
the envisioned ‘science of man’ and, within that framework, aspired to do for 
moral philosophy (the ‘science of man’) what Bacon, Galileo, Newton, and the 
like did for natural philosophy (Smith 1995, 1997). Even though Hume hoped to 
develop an ‘accurate anatomy of human nature’ (Hume 1978: 263), his aim was 
not to equate human nature with physical nature. The general demarcation at 
issue was between the practice of a science of human nature and metaphysical 
speculation. The contrast (and thus the content of the concept of human nature) 
was not between the natural and the supranatural, but between empirical inves-
tigations and speculative metaphysics. Yet the pragmatic function stayed the 
same: the demarcation and exclusion of styles of inquiry. 
The term ‘nature’ in ‘human nature’ had two different epistemic roles to play in 
this context. Hume was invoking, in my terms, both a descriptive and an explan-
atory nature. As a descriptive category, the term was used, as just mentioned, to 
describe the explanandum of the ‘science of man’. Hume was looking to establish 
a science with human nature as the explanandum, a science that would uncover 
our typical and species-specific ways of being (the human life form), which in 
turn would be subject to law-like generalizations similar to the laws of nature. 
Simultaneously, the term ‘nature’ was used as an explanatory category. It re-
ferred to capacities, and the goal was to explain overt behaviour in terms of a 
nature (a set of capacities) that was atemporally given, and more or less inhering 
in (i.e. internal to) more or less all people. In his famous account of causation, for 
instance, Hume argued that our causal inferences rely on habit, and that habit 
was part of human nature (i.e. how humans naturally function). Thus Hume held 
that if we want to understand why we talk and think about causation the way we 
do, then we have to understand human nature. However, internal natural capaci-
ties such as habit were not themselves Hume’s target of explanation; they were 
taken as generalizations about humans that were assumed to be part of the ex-
planans, i.e. part of what explains human behaviour (i.e. causal reasoning). He 
used the term ‘human nature’ to refer to an explanatory nature that was assumed. 
According to Hume, we cannot study this explanatory nature, since hypotheses 
about its cause should ‘be rejected as presumptions and chimerical’ (Hume 1978: 
xvii). Thus habit is ‘a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowl-
edged, and which is well known by its effects’ (Hume 1975: 43); it is a ‘primitive 
element’ of human understanding, as Norton (1993: 158) writes, interpreting 
Hume as I do here. 
 Smith (1995, 1997) concludes from Hume and other Enlightenment philosophers’ 
talk about human nature that a shared aim at that time was to describe the char-
acteristics of humans in an empirical—i.e. in an evidence-based and systematic 
manner—rather than in a speculative, metaphysical manner. Thus the same kind 
of demarcation and exclusion as in ancient Greek medicine is intended, even 
though the contrast has changed somewhat. 
But how was it the case that ‘human nature’ was able to play this demarcation 
function? First, this was all that these Enlightenment thinkers could agree on, 
since opinion on the precise contents of what it ‘means to be human’ varied 
widely. Hobbes rallied for the egoistic man, Rousseau for the noble savage, and 
La Mettrie for man as a machine, to name just three philosophers involved in 
Enlightenment discussions about human nature. Smith (1995, 1997) concludes 
that during the Enlightenment, the concept of a ‘human nature’ helped to create 
and maintain a common language, a framework for discourse, which in turn al-
lowed for discussion of the differences in opinion about the specific qualities of 
human nature (as explanandum). It helped to unite and demarcate a specific kind 
of Enlightenment philosophy, just as the concept of natural diseases helped to 
unite and demarcate the Hippocratics. Second, modern science—an institution of 
systematic and empirical study—was being established at this time, but did not 
yet have a secure enough foundation from which to defend its style of inquiry 
against speculative philosophy. As with the Hippocratics, in the absence of se-
cure legal or other institutional means with which to defend one’s epistemic au-
thority over a subject matter, concepts—epistemic tools—were used to demarcate 
and exclude styles of inquiry. 
The historical conclusion that I want to draw from this is that the content of the 
concept of human nature may have varied, but the pragmatic function remained 
the same: the demarcation and legitimization of a specific style of inquiry, and 
the exclusion of other styles as irrelevant or illegitimate. Having used only two 
cases, the conclusion I can draw is limited. But the comparison of the two cases 
gives us something at least: the contents of the concept of ‘nature’ or ‘the natural’ 
varied, whereas the demarcation function of the concept stayed the same. The 
concept (and term) ‘nature’ united people against an enemy with a different style 
of inquiry. And in both cases, this demarcation was connected to a distinction 
between different kinds of explanations. Even so, the contents only varied nar-
rowly, since the contrast at issue was similar. I will now turn to a clearly different 
contrast, that between physis and nomos, or nature and culture. 
10.7  PHYSIS AND NOMOS IN GREEK ANTIQUITY 
As with the origin of the contrast between natural and supranatural, the origin of 
the contrast between physis (nature) and nomos (culture) is believed to lie in 
Greek antiquity. Has the distinction also been motivated by the need for demar-
cation between styles of inquiry? The author(s) of Airs, Waters, and Places might 
have believed something like, ‘we medical scientists will take care of physis, 
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 physical characteristics, while you philosophers, please take care of nomos’. Un-
like the divide between the natural and supranatural, finding evidence that the 
divide between nature and culture had a social demarcation role in Greek antiq-
uity is difficult. 
In Greek antiquity, the contrast between physis and nomos was not yet fully de-
veloped. First and foremost, the Hippocratic authors—for example, those of Airs, 
Waters, and Places, as well as those of On the Sacred Disease—assumed an inher-
itance of acquired characteristics. Indeed, the inheritance of acquired characteris-
tics was assumed by almost everyone in Greek antiquity; it was simply common 
sense, and stayed so well into the nineteenth century.11 If acquired characters can 
be inherited—if nomos successively turns into physis—then physis and nomos are 
so entangled that demarcation based on them seems unlikely. 
Second, philosophers had not fully developed a strong contrast between these 
two ideas either, primarily because of the teleological way nature was conceived 
of at that time—a point that is of utmost importance for understanding the his-
torical connections between nature, natural law, and laws of nature.12 Nature 
(often capitalized, to refer to the ‘things of Nature’) and the natures of things 
were connected to a goal or telos. For Aristotle, the connection between physis and 
nomos was thus quite tight. In his Politics, Aristotle spells out that by nature, hu-
mans form male–female bonds, then households, and then, to secure the repro-
ductive bonds and those things necessary to make that bond successful, they 
form the Greek polis, with its laws and customs—that is, nomos. It is a part of ful-
filling our nature (i.e. our physis and natural telos) for humans to form male–
female bonds, households, a polis, and nomos. Thus it is not only the case that 
Aristotle can be understood as the first theoretical biologist (his biological treatis-
es often contained more scientific detail than the Hippocratic treatises); he also 
regarded nomos (part of the life form and telos of the human species) as an inte-
gral part of nature, not as contrasted with it. 
Certainly, Aristotle is just one example, and it is almost sinful to ignore all the 
other philosophers of his time who also had something to say on the matter of 
physis and nomos;13 but given what we know about the situation generally, it 
would be a surprise if the dichotomy were fully developed at that time. In addi-
tion to the fact that the belief in inheritance of acquired characteristics was stand-
ard, there was no need to use the divide in order to exclude a certain group of 
people from a certain epistemic practice (be it descriptive, classificatory, or ex-
planatory), since biology and political philosophy were mostly the preserve of 
the same set of people, namely, Greek philosophers like Aristotle. Granted, there 
                                            
11 See Zirkle (1946) on the long history of the belief in inheritance of acquired characteris-
tics. 
12 See Collingwood (1945) on nature teleologically conceived. 
13 See Heinimann (1945) for a book length in-depth analysis of the contrast in Greek an-
tiquity. 
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 were the Hippocratics, specializing in diseases; but the philosophers seem (to the 
best of my knowledge) to have had no stake in, and didn’t interfere with, the 
business of these experts. In turn, these experts had other enemies to fight in the 
marketplace of healing people, as illustrated above. 
Things changed towards the end of the nineteenth century. The divide between 
nature and culture hardened, and became generalized as ‘nature versus nurture’. 
This development created a gap or, as in the title of Evelyn Fox Keller’s (2010) 
book on this subject, a ‘mirage of space between nature and nurture’. Increasing-
ly, this gap was perceived as unbridgeable. The hardening of the divide was 
again connected with a marketplace, no longer the polis but the developing insti-
tutions of academia, with its emerging disciplinary separations. The divide be-
tween nature and culture came to mark the boundaries of different academic 
fields, helping to make disciplines and the divisions of authority clear-cut. 
10.8   THE ADVENT OF HEREDITY AND THE RALLY AGAINST LA-
MARCKIAN INHERITANCE 
According to the received view, Charles Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton intro-
duced the ‘modern’ nature/nurture divide (a variant of the nature/culture di-
vide). He famously used the phrase ‘nature and nurture’ as ‘a convenient jingle 
of words, for it separates under two distinct heads the innumerable elements of 
which personality is composed. Nature is all that a man brings with himself into 
the world; nurture is every influence from without that affects him after his birth’ 
(Galton 1874: 12). Galton believed that the ‘distinction is clear’ (p. 12). In the con-
text in which he was writing, the distinction was indeed clear, since it was a con-
text that had heredity as a new field-structuring explanandum, uniting people 
against its opponents. And, as before, words (Galton’s ‘convenient jingle of 
words’) were important to mark the boundary. The term ‘nature’ (here referring 
to hereditary developmental resources) and its contrast (nurture as an inclusive 
term for culture, environment, and everything else not transmitted via biological 
reproduction) became crucial to defending the line between those studying bio-
logical heredity in a new (i.e. statistical as well as experimental) manner and 
those doing something else. 
In the nineteenth century, historians such as López-Beltrán (1994) claim, there 
was an intellectual shift: reference to the adjective ‘hereditary’ (as in ‘hereditary 
disease’) was increasingly replaced by a nominal use of the noun ‘heredity’ as a 
field-defining phenomenon in need of explanation. This amounts to a reification, 
bringing with it new ontological commitments and the creation of, in Müller-
Wille and Rheinberger’s (2007) terms, a new ‘epistemic space’. But most im-
portantly,  
“[it] also implies a concomitant shift, namely the erosion of a set of very 
ancient distinctions with respect to similarities between parents and off-
spring, which the modern notion of heredity systematically cuts across. 
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 Distinctions had been made between specific versus individual, paternal 
versus maternal, ancestral versus parental, normal versus pathological 
similarities, and even between similarities pertaining to the left and the 
right halves of the body. Such distinctions gave way to a generalized notion 
of heredity that focused on elementary traits or dispositions independent 
of the particular life forms they were part of, whether pathological or 
normal, maternal or paternal, individual or specific.” (Müller-Wille and 
Rheinberger 2007: 13; emphasis added)  
Galton replaced these older distinctions with a new generalized distinction, the 
nature/nurture divide. The establishment of this contrast was strongly influ-
enced by Galton’s anti-Lamarckism. 
Galton developed the idea of particulate inheritance—an idea already discussed 
by Charles Darwin—which took biologically inherited developmental resources 
as material substances—‘gemmules’ in Darwin’s case and ‘stirps’ in Galton’s. For 
Galton, the hereditary units were material and internal to individuals, as they 
were for Darwin; contra Darwin, however, for Galton they were also fixed, un-
changeable—as ahistoric as the units of the physical and chemical world. They 
are elements: ‘elements of which personality is composed’ (Galton 1874: 12). As 
elements, they cannot be changed during individual development. Thus, inher-
itance was ‘hard’ (relying on unchangeable elements), rather than ‘soft’ (as in the 
Lamarckian picture). Consequently, Galton’s distinction between stirp and per-
son (between latent and patent elements) counts as predecessor of the 
germ/soma distinction, later introduced by Weismann. With respect to Lamarck-
ian inheritance, Galton stood against most of his peers, and also against his 
cousin Charles Darwin. Others, such as Wallace and most famously Weismann, 
later joined in to form a front against Lamarckian inheritance. 
Using the term ‘nature’, with its history of playing an authority-establishing de-
marcation role, was part and parcel of Galton’s theory of particulate and hard 
heredity. Since Galton’s view on heredity and the nature/nurture contrast also 
involved a specific style of inquiry (namely, statistics and the use of twin studies, 
combined with experimental studies), we can regard the case as analogous to the 
other case studies: ‘nature’ is used to demarcate, though the demarcation does 
not make distinct disciplines so much as distinct styles of inquiry in the emerging 
study of heredity, development, and evolution. In conclusion, this nineteenth-
century case tells a similar story to those of the previous two. 
10.9  THE FORMATION OF CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY AS AN ACA-
DEMIC DISCIPLINE 
Mirroring the formation of heredity as a field-defining explanandum, ‘culture’ 
played a similar role, and did so at roughly the same time (the turn of the twenti-
eth century), when cultural anthropology began to assert its identity among the 
other aspiring scientific disciplines (mainly the new experimental genetics and 
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 psychology), as well as the traditional physical anthropology, and a tradition of 
museum-based anthropology with its strong racist leanings. In the mid-
nineteenth century, anthropology was not yet a separate academic discipline, 
even though interest in studying the differences between cultures dates back to 
at least Greek antiquity; it arises, for example, in the Hippocratic Treatise on Airs, 
Waters, and Places. 
Edward B. Tylor (1871), often treated as the grandfather of scientific anthropolo-
gy, saw ‘culture’ contrasted with ‘nature’, but culture was mainly an explanan-
dum. In other words, the concept of culture in the mid-nineteenth century did 
not yet serve the function of demarcating causes: it was not used to divide kinds 
of causes to explain behaviour, either explicitly or at the theoretical level. There 
was an awareness of different kinds of causes influencing development, but the 
dominant pragmatic function of the concept of culture was to define kinds of 
people (rather than kinds of causes), and to point at historical change (often 
called ‘civilization’) or the emergence of institutions. Culture described behav-
iour (the explanandum), but it was not yet used as the label for a field-defining 
style of explanation that contrasted nature with culture. And how could it be 
otherwise, given that Tylor, as most people at his time, believed in the intricate 
connection between nature and nurture through the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics? 
It was Alfred L. Kroeber who radicalized the nature/culture divide. He took the 
perspective of his teacher Franz Boas, who studied, among other things, the in-
fluence of culture on physical traits among immigrants to the United States, as 
illustrated by Stocking (1968: 195–233). Boas explicitly treated culture as a specific 
explanatory factor in the development of the traits of individuals. Kroeber went 
further, taking culture to be not only a factor in the development of individuals, 
but a field-defining explanandum in its own right. As with Tylor, culture was the 
explanandum, but one that was explicitly, theoretically, and completely decou-
pled from nature. This was the basis of his ‘cultural determinism’: culture is ex-
plained by culture alone, and what is inherited by nature is explained by nature 
alone. 
Kroeber felt the need to demarcate his own and his peers’ business from that of 
others. Kroeber and his fellow anthropologists had degrees to secure their intel-
lectual authority (in fact, he was Columbia University’s first PhD in anthropolo-
gy, and the ninth in the US), but these degrees—with their potential to be sym-
bolic capital, seals of quality, and weapons to defend their authority over a field 
of study—were not yet taken very seriously. In the absence of a secured voice 
and a secured authority over their subject area, concepts (as in the case of the 
Hippocratics) were their weapon of choice. 
Kroeber was outspoken about his goal of defending the exclusive authority of 
cultural anthropologists over the study of culture, leaving individual develop-
ment for the aspiring psychologists and nature for physical anthropologists and 
geneticists. As a result, his case is rather well known. With the exception of 
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 Stocking (1968: 259), however, what has often been ignored is that when Kroeber 
claimed autonomy for culture, he was assuming Weismann’s theory of inher-
itance as proof that the decoupling of culture from nature was possible, and thus 
that traits caused by culture could be explained independently of nature, and 
vice versa. I have said more on his case elsewhere (Kronfeldner 2009). The most 
important point for our purposes here is that the decoupling he defended rested 
on a denial of the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and 
was done in the service of disciplinary demarcation and the exclusion of any 
style of explanation of culture that relied on biology.14 Like the Hippocratics, he 
regarded nature as given. However, he gave the attached pragmatic function a 
negative twist: human nature was taken as a disciplinary primitive; it was again 
taken for granted, but only in order to have the right to ignore it.15 Still, ‘nature’ 
demarcated kinds of causes (but those to be ignored), united those in the same 
business of studying a particular kind of cause, and served to demarcate their 
work from others. 
To sum up this case: if we look at the formation of cultural anthropology at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and compare it to the other cases we have 
looked at, we see that the enemies have changed, the contrast has changed, but 
what stayed the same was the pragmatic function the term ‘nature’ played in 
demarcating expertise and excluding styles of inquiry, and be it via its contrast. 
10.10   MOVING TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
When we move to the twenty-first century, we see the same pattern. Edouard 
Machery (2008) defends what he calls a ‘nomological notion of human nature’ 
(contrasted with essentialist ones). He discusses why his concept is ‘worth 
fighting for’ and writes:  
“saying that a given property, say a behaviour, such as biparental invest-
ment, or a psychological trait, such as outgroup bias, belongs to human 
nature [...] is also to say that some kinds of explanation for the occurrence 
of this trait among humans are inappropriate. Particularly, this is to reject 
any explanation to the effect that its occurrence is exclusively due to en-
culturation or to social learning.” (Machery 2008: 326)  
Machery regards ‘explanations […] exclusively due to enculturation or to social 
learning’ as mere ‘proximate explanations’, and explanations ‘due to nature’ as 
                                            
14 Interestingly, geneticists joined in with this division of labour—e.g. Thomas H. Mor-
gan and later Dobzhansky—which Richerson (Ch. 8 this volume) describes as agreeing to 
a ‘peace treaty’. This very much fits the picture developed here. 
15 For a philosophical defence of what I have called here ‘the right to ignore’ certain 
causal factors—e.g. to ignore human nature or to ignore human culture in one’s explana-
tion of behaviour—see Kronfeldner (2017).  
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 ‘ultimate explanations’. According to him, the latter are the appropriate explana-
tions for typical features of human behaviour and cognition. 
Irrespective of whether it makes sense, philosophically and scientifically, to div-
vy up things that way, this fits the historical pattern I describe: Machery uses 
‘human nature’ for epistemic demarcation, dividing causes into different kinds 
and defending a specific style of explanation (in his case, a kind of evolutionary 
psychology) as the appropriate and specialized style of inquiry for the kind of 
causes—evolutionary causes—that are deemed to be ‘natural’ rather than ‘cul-
tural’.16 
This kind of appropriation is likely to continue, I reckon, be it with respect to the 
discussion of whether cognitive science has its own way of carving out a concept 
of human nature (see Heyes, Chapter 4 in this volume) or whether anthropology 
can reclaim human nature for its explanatory goal of studying constrained diver-
sity.17 
10.11   CONCLUSIONS 
That the concept and the term ‘nature’, and its contrasts in the context of study-
ing humans, have the pragmatic function of demarcating expertise and excluding 
styles of inquiry is an important reason why the concept is still with us; the con-
cept can be used to exclude certain kinds of causal factors as being relevant in a 
given context. The contexts I discussed were: 
• Hippocratic versus divine healers; 
• Enlightenment philosophers defending a ‘science of man’ versus specula-
tive metaphysics; 
• the study of ‘hard heredity’ versus the Lamarckian approach; 
• genetics and physical anthropology versus cultural anthropology; 
• evolutionary psychology versus the social sciences. 
Further contexts and an open-ended amount of detail could be added to each 
item on the list, but this kind of historical completeness is not my aim here.18 To 
sum up, without reaching any such completeness: even though the methods, the 
implied contrasts, as well as the content of the term ‘nature’ (and thus the con-
                                            
16 Machery has revised his account in a couple of ways (see 2012, and Ch. 1 this volume), 
but the demarcation remains. 
17 As argued by Fiona Jordan and Heidi Colleran in their paper delivered at the ‘Why 
We Disagree about Human Nature’ conference, in Cambridge, 2015, and which gave rise 
to this volume. 
18 As Raymond Williams (2011: 186) once said with respect to the history of the word 
‘nature’, because of the intricate and many-layered texture of the landscape of contrasts 
and cognates, ‘Any full history of the uses of nature would be a history of a large part of 
human thought.’ 
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 cept) all varied in the cases mentioned in this chapter, the function of demarcat-
ing kinds of relevant causes and styles of inquiry stayed the same.  
‘Nature’ was always what could be taken for granted, established as solid, au-
thoritative, as ‘what was presupposed to be there to investigate: its supposed 
objective reality was what guaranteed the viability of the investigation. Yet what 
that vaunted objective reality consisted in was contested in every conceivable 
respect’ (Lloyd 1991: 432). I showed that this dictum of Lloyd holds in all the cas-
es surveyed here. In the case of the Hippocratics, some Enlightenment philoso-
phers, and the study of heredity in the nineteenth century, ‘nature’ and ‘human 
nature’ served to define a style of inquiry (or practice) in a positive sense, as a 
field-defining explanandum. In the case of Kroeber, it did so in a negative sense, 
since he regarded human nature as a disciplinary primitive. In all cases, ‘nature’ 
demarcated kinds of causes, united those in the same business of studying a par-
ticular kind of cause, and served to demarcate their work from others. Demarca-
tion and exclusion is connected with rather non-epistemic pragmatic aims—
securing jobs, money, and power—but it is also connected to epistemic issues in 
two ways: it involves concepts, and it serves to distinguish kinds of causal expla-
nations (e.g. proximate versus ultimate) and the experts devoted to them. 
What I have shown also helps us to understand parts of contemporary debates 
concerning human nature. Machery (2008, 2012, Chapter 1 in this volume) de-
fends a descriptive concept of human nature that caters to the needs of certain 
evolution-minded fields, such as evolutionary psychology, that prioritize evolu-
tionary explanations. Stotz (2010), Griffiths (2011), Lewens (2012), Ramsey (2013, 
Chapter 2 in this volume), and Stotz and Griffiths (Chapter 3 in this volume) are 
sceptical about these needs because it involves the nature/culture divide in a 
manner that is now contested. They opt for a different concept of human nature, 
one that is most inclusive and does not divide between kinds of causes, but they 
ignore that their choice might also serve specific needs. In the case of Stotz and 
Griffiths, it is the needs of those who care most about explaining development 
and stressing the importance of development for evolutionary thinking. But that 
is not the only explanandum in which human nature plays a role. Samuels (2012) 
defends a concept of human nature that is explanatory in a sense that serves the 
needs of cognitive scientists, who are not necessarily interested in explaining 
development. Ramsey (Chapter 2) is concerned with ‘how traits come about’, and 
presents his account as tracking the regularities of the human life form that can 
also be explained mechanistically. Lewens (2015) is most interested, like Machery, 
in a human nature concept serving the needs of evolutionary thinking, but he 
disagrees about which concept of human nature fits these needs, especially if 
cultural evolution is taken into account. 
What is common to most of these authors is that they still look at the issue from a 
monistic perspective: they look for one concept that will replace the outdated, 
essentialist concept of human nature. They all want to appropriate the term for 
their preferred epistemic role, presumably sometimes even to utilize the authori-
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 ty in the term ‘nature’. But, I contend, there will be no one concept that fits all the 
needs of the diverse range of styles of inquiry that employ the term ‘human na-
ture’. As part of an essentialist picture (as described in Section 10.1, and in more 
detail in Kronfeldner et al. 2014), all epistemic roles were supposed to be fulfilled 
by one entity in the world. In the post-essentialist picture, there are at least three 
scientific ‘natures’ replacing an essence: a classificatory nature, a descriptive na-
ture, and an explanatory nature. Criteria for membership of a particular form of 
life, descriptions of forms of life, and causal factors (or mechanisms) of special 
importance for explaining these forms of life are simply not the same things. 
These three kinds of ‘natures’ have an equal right to be regarded as a replace-
ment candidate for the outdated essentialist concept, since they each retain one of 
the epistemic roles of the essentialist concept. But they can claim only one epis-
temic role directly; the others are reconstructed indirectly, if at all. Finally, with 
respect to the explanatory nature, specific disagreements arise because of the 
complexity of causation (namely, there are always multiple causes involved). 
Given this complexity, there are different ways to divvy up the totality of devel-
opmental and evolutionary causes. Consequently, one can focus on one or anoth-
er kind of cause as more important, and the focus will depend on the disciplinary 
affiliation of the experts. It is not an ‘anything goes pluralism’ that is defended 
here (as claimed in Stotz and Griffiths, Chapter 3). Rather, it is a pluralism that 
applies explanatory parity not only ontologically (at the level of causal factors 
involved) but also at the level of the multitude of epistemic interests involved in 
talk about human nature. 
This chapter described (rather than evaluated) the authority inherent in the term 
‘nature’ to elucidate one of the reasons we disagree about human nature. I close 
with a few points connecting to the discussion in this chapter. Some will argue 
that, as a matter of principle, science should not rely on power and identity poli-
tics. Independently of such an in-principle argument, one can also argue that 
using the term ‘nature’ for demarcation is no longer necessary, given the disci-
plinary differentiations firmly established in the architecture of contemporary 
academia. One might further support such an ‘eliminative’ stance by stressing 
that aside from demarcation, the cost of eliminating the term ‘human nature’ in 
scientific discourse is rather low. Everything we might want to say about what 
we above called ‘descriptive nature’, ‘explanatory nature’, or ‘classificatory na-
ture’ could be said without using the term ‘nature’. Some, however, might reply 
that if serious scientific work eliminates the term ‘human nature’, then others will 
still use it for their goals and do so without relying on the standards of scientific 
reasoning.19 Is it thus better to appropriate the term for scientific usage? In any 
case, a detailed discussion of this ‘elimination question’ must take into account 
                                            
19 As argued by Fiona Jordan and Heidi Colleran in their paper delivered at the ‘Why We 
Disagree about Human Nature’ conference, in Cambridge, 2015. 
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 pragmatic aspects of the term ‘nature’. This paper tried to analyse one such 
pragmatic aspect, the authority in the term ‘nature’.20 
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